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DEFENDING THE SANCTITY OF LIFE 
PRINCIPLE: A REPLY TO JOHN KEOWN 
 




This article is a response to Professor Keown’s criticism of my paper “Finding a Way Through 
the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13 (3) 
Medical Law Review 357. The article takes up and responds to a number of criticisms raised 
by Keown in an attempt to further the debate concerning the moral and legal status of 
withdrawing life-sustaining measures, its distinction from euthanasia, and the implications of 
the lawfulness of withdrawal for the principle of the sanctity of life.  
 
 
John Keown has written a considered criticism of my paper ‘Finding a Way 
Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withholding and Withdrawing Medical 
Treatment and Euthanasia’,1 and there can be no doubt that his interrogation 
of the claims in my paper will, if I can answer him, advance the debate in this 
difficult ethical and conceptual terrain. Although I believe his criticisms of my 
paper ultimately fail and are based on a number of misconceptions, Keown’s 
paper has led me to provide an extended discussion and elaboration of 
certain points that were discussed in the original paper and, to that extent, has 
provided an opportunity to carry this debate forward. The issues of interest 
here are extremely important, concerning no less than whether English, 
American and Australian law on end of life decision making is on the right 
track or whether, on the contrary, the law has taken a wrong turn and urgently 
needs to be changed, either judicially or by legislative intervention. It is 
Keown’s contention that the law is currently “morally and intellectually 
misshapen” and is in urgent need of significant modification. I disagree. My 
original paper was an attempt to explain why I think Keown is fundamentally 
mistaken on this point. Here, I will show why I maintain this view, in spite of 
Keown’s thoughtful reply. 
 
1. Background: intentional withdrawal 2  and the 
sanctity of life 
 
Before turning to the issues of contention between myself and John Keown, I 
will briefly situate our debate in its broader context. In my paper, I attempted 
to defend the legal approach to withdrawal of life-sustaining measures from 
terminally-ill patients that was adopted by the House of Lords in Airedale 
National Health Service Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789 (hereafter, Bland).  
 
                                                 
1 Andrew McGee, “Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze: Withdrawal of Medical 
Treatment and Euthanasia” (2005) 13(3) Medical Law Review 357. John Keown, “A Futile 
Defence of Bland: A Reply to Andrew McGee” (2005) 13(3) Medical Law Review 393.  
2 In this paper, as in the original paper, I use “withdrawal” to refer to both the withholding of 
life-sustaining measures and their withdrawal. 
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In essence, their Lordships all agreed that the intentional taking of life by 
lethal injection is wrong, but the intentional taking of life by withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures is, in appropriate circumstances, to be legally permitted 
and that, consequently, the principle of the sanctity of life is not absolute. In 
the case of Anthony Bland who, as a result of the Hillsborough disaster, had 
fallen into a permanent vegetative state (hereafter, “PVS”), withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures would be lawful because it would not be in Anthony’s 
best interests to continue providing the life-sustaining measures. Their 
Lordships justified the difference between lawful withdrawal and unlawful 
lethal injection by holding that, when life-sustaining medical treatment is 
lawfully withdrawn from a PVS patient, the death of the patient is intended,3 
but the patient’s death would not be regarded in law as having been caused 
by the withdrawal but rather by the patient’s underlying condition. In 
withdrawing the treatment the doctor merely omits the continued provision of 
the life-sustaining measures rather than actively killing the patient as would be 
the case if he or she administered a lethal injection, though the judges 
acknowledged some difficulty in accepting the relevance of the act/omission 
distinction.  
 
This reasoning led to a number of calls for reform to the common law or for 
legislative intervention. For those sympathetic to the legalisation of 
euthanasia, the recognition that death was intended, along with 
acknowledged difficulties in maintaining a morally relevant distinction between 
acts and omissions, makes it seem like an extremely short step from Bland to 
the full legalisation of euthanasia4  and assisted dying.5  On the other hand, 
for those who resist the legalisation of euthanasia and assisted dying,6 an 
alternative basis, which does not rely on the act/omission distinction, has 
been sought to justify the distinction between withdrawal and euthanasia. This 
consists of appealing to the doctor’s respective intentions in withdrawing 
treatment on the one hand and administering a lethal injection on the other. 
Rather than regard withdrawal of life-sustaining measures as the intentional 
termination of life, one might instead regard it as the intentional relief from 
pain or burdensome treatment, of which the death of the patient is a mere 
foreseen side effect. John Finnis advocates this approach.7 I believe that John 
Keown has also advocated this approach. However, in his reply, Keown 
claims not to have advanced this argument.8 We will examine Keown’s claim 
in the light of his book, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy,9 in section 2 
                                                 
3 [1993] AC 789 at 876-7, 881, 887, 896. 
4 Peter Singer makes this point in Rethinking Life and Death (Oxford 1994) p 75. 
5 Lord Joffe’s Assisted Dying Bill, which aimed to make it lawful for doctors to prescribe (but 
not administer) drugs for a terminally ill patient to use to end their lives (if they were suffering 
unbearably and had only 6 months to live), was first introduced into the House of Lords on 8 
January 2004. It was defeated in the House on 12 May 2006. 
6 In what follows, a reference to ‘euthanasia’ is to be taken to include ‘assisted dying’ for the 
purposes of the issues discussed in this paper, although it should be noted that assisted 
dying is normally distinguished from voluntary euthanasia. For the purpose of this paper, I 
treat them as not relevantly different in so far as both euthanasia and assisted dying involve 
the active shortening of the patient’s life. 
7 See for example J M Finnis, ‘Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?’ (1993) 109 Law Quarterly 
Review 329 p 335. 
8 See J Keown, n 1 p 396. 
9 J Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy (Cambridge 2002) p 42. 
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below, where it will be seen that Keown does indeed advance this argument 
and is logically committed to it in light of his rejection of the moral relevance of 
the act/omission distinction.10 
 
Although I defend the distinction between intention and foresight in the 
context of end of life decision making, I believe that this distinction cannot be 
used to resolve the apparent difficulties with Bland because death in 
withdrawal of medical treatment from a terminally ill patient is always 
intended. Instead, the reasoning in Bland is correct and the act/omission 
distinction on which Bland relied can be provided with a robust defence. In 
particular, the anxieties expressed by Lord Mustill and Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
are unjustified, and their Lordships have wrongly assumed that the principle of 
the sanctity of life is not absolute.11 The act/omission distinction, in the context 
of withdrawal, should be understood in terms of the distinction between 
deciding not to artificially prolong a patient’s life, on the one hand, and 
between deciding to shorten a patient’s life, on the other. In the case of not 
artificially prolonging the patient’s life, the doctor is deciding that he or she 
should stop artificially intervening in the natural course of events, but should 
allow nature to take its course.12  In the case of deciding to shorten the 
patient’s life, by contrast, we start intervening in the natural course of events 
and wrest the patient’s ultimate fate from nature’s hands, so to speak. Here, 
instead of allowing nature to take its course and waiting for death to occur 
naturally, we take control and bring about the patient’s death prematurely. 13  
 
The distinction between prolonging and shortening life is therefore capable of 
lending rational support to the moral intuition that, although we should not 
‘play God’ or override nature by ending a person’s life prematurely, we are not 
under any duty to artificially prolong a person’s life in all circumstances. 
Consequently, the sanctity of life principle is not compromised at all but, on 
the contrary, remains intact.14  
 
Keown takes my arguments for this conclusion to task. It is therefore to the 
specific aspects of our debate concerning these issues that I now turn.  
 
2. Keown’s criticism of Bland: his reliance on the 
intention/foresight distinction 
 
The point of departure for Keown’s criticism of Bland is that there emerges 
from the case an inconsistency which allegedly renders the law morally and 
intellectually misshapen: Bland permits intentional killing by omission but 
forbids intentional killing by acts.15 I claim in my paper that both Finnis and 
                                                 
10 This no doubt explains the considerable attention he pays to the distinction in his reply. See 
J Keown, n1 pp 393-4, and 397ff. 
11 See A McGee, n 1 p 382ff. 
12 See A McGee, n 1 p 383. 
13 See A McGee, n 1 p 382ff. 
14 See A McGee, n 1 p 382ff. 
15 J Keown, n 9 pp 68, 233 and 236. 
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Keown contend that the way to restore moral and intellectual shape to the law 
and make it more consistent is to reject the majority view in Bland that, in 
withdrawing life-sustaining measures from Anthony, the doctors necessarily 
intended to kill him.16 In his reply to my paper Keown claims that he does not 
advance this argument.17  Keown claims that, in the context of the issues 
raised by Bland, his preoccupation has been with the inconsistency that 
results when the law allows death by intentional omissions but disallows death 
by intentional acts, and with the implications this has for the sanctity of life 
principle.18 I see no difficulty in acknowledging this point, but my contention is 
that, in order to support these claims, Keown makes extensive appeal to the 
intention/foresight distinction and his criticisms of Bland are entirely 
dependent on his application of this distinction to the withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures.19 Furthermore, Keown does not stop short at simply 
pointing out the inconsistency, but recommends an alternative approach that 
avoids any such inconsistency and that also remains faithful to the sanctity of 
life principle. This alternative approach presupposes that the 
intention/foresight distinction can be applied to lawful withdrawal so that, for 
instance, one can distinguish between withdrawals where the patient’s death 
is intended and withdrawals where the patient’s death is merely foreseen. My 
criticisms of Keown therefore extend to his whole approach to the moral 
permissibility of withdrawal of medical treatment. Because, in his reply, Keown 
appears to try to distance himself from such an approach, it will be necessary 
to briefly trace the steps in Keown’s argument here. 
 
First, Keown regards the act/omission distinction as morally and legally 
unjustified, and therefore rejects this aspect of the Bland decision:  
 
The distinction between acts and omissions is, where the doctor’s intention is 
identical, a distinction without a difference.20 
 
Second, precisely because the distinction between acts and omissions is not 
morally or legally relevant, Keown maintains that intentional killing is wrong 
whether it was brought about by an act or an omission, and so their Lordships 
went wrong in sanctioning intentional killing by means of withdrawal:  
 
Intentionally shortening a patient’s life by withholding treatment, or food, water or 
warmth is no less wrong than injecting a lethal poison.21  
 
For this reason, Keown labels the decision in Bland the sanctioning of what he 
calls “passive euthanasia”. Passive euthanasia is precisely the intentional 
killing by an omission, and since the distinction between an act and omission 
                                                 
16 See A McGee, n 1 p 360. 
17 J Keown, n 1 p 396. 
18 J Keown, n 1 p 396. 
19 See A McGee, n 1 pp 370 to 371. 
20 In the same passage, Keown writes: “If a patient says to a doctor: ‘Doctor, I want to hasten 
my death. Please help me’, what is the moral difference between the doctor intentionally 
doing so by, on the one hand, giving the patient a lethal pill and, on the other, switching off 
the patient’s life-support machine?...if the doctor’s intention is the same in both cases, where 
is the moral difference?’ J Keown, n 9 p 67. 
21 J Keown, n 9 p 42. 
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is a distinction without a difference, passive euthanasia is “no less wrong than 
injecting a lethal poison”.22  The following passage makes it clear that Keown 
attributes to Bland the sanctioning of passive euthanasia: 
 
…a doctor who switches off a ventilator, or who withdraws a patient’s tube-feeding, 
performs euthanasia if the doctor’s intention is to kill the patient. Euthanasia by 
deliberate omission is often called ‘passive euthanasia’ (PE) to distinguish it from 
active euthanasia. A good example of PE is the case of Tony Bland.23 
 
How, then, does Keown himself regard the status of withdrawal, given his 
rejection of the act/omission distinction and given his acceptance that 
intentional killing by withdrawal is a species of euthanasia and is morally 
wrong? The only logical alternative is to reject the view that in all cases of 
withdrawal from a terminally ill patient, the patient’s death is intended – there 
can be withdrawals where the patient’s death is not intended and where, 
consequently, no passive euthanasia is undertaken.  
 
It will come as no surprise, then, to discover that Keown does adopt this 
alternative. It is possible, he maintains, to have a species of withdrawal which 
does not amount to passive euthanasia. In making this point, he relies on the 
intention/foresight distinction: 
 
...a doctor may properly withhold or withdraw a life-prolonging treatment which is 
futile (that is, cannot secure a significant therapeutic benefit) or which the patient 
would find too burdensome, even though the doctor foresees that non-treatment may 
or will result in the patient’s life ending sooner than would otherwise be the case.24 
 
This passage proves that Keown regards the intention/foresight distinction to 
be applicable to cases of withholding and withdrawing treatment – a 
distinction he devotes an entire chapter of his book to defending.25 He clearly 
believes it is possible to claim that, in withdrawing treatment, the doctor does 
not always intend the patient’s death, but may merely foresee that it will occur. 
This difference between withdrawing as passive euthanasia, which Keown 
rules out, and withdrawal where death is merely foreseen, allows him to 
defend the sanctity of life principle, as follows: 
 
In short, the inviolability principle rules out the purposeful shortening of patients’ lives, 
either by act or omission, but permits the withholding of futile or excessively 
burdensome life-prolonging treatment, even when the doctor foresees that death will 
come sooner.26 
 
As can be seen from this quotation, without the intention/foresight distinction 
as his disposal, Keown would not be able to defend the sanctity of life doctrine 
in the context of withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures. The 
applicability of the distinction between intention and foresight to withholding 
and withdrawing is, of course, the point on which Keown and I disagree, and it 
is this point that I will discuss in detail in section 3 of this paper. If the sanctity 
                                                 
22 J Keown, n 9 p 42. 
23 J Keown, n 9 p 12 (Keown’s emphasis). 
24 Italics added. J Keown, n 9 p 42. 
25 J Keown, n 9 Ch. 2. 
26 Italics added, J Keown, ‘Beyond Bland’ (2000) 20 Legal Studies 66 p 71.  
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of life doctrine is to be defended, it must be defended by means of the 
act/omission distinction. But for now it should be noted that his attempt to 
distance himself from the target of my objections in his reply, though 
welcome, cannot withstand a proper scrutiny of his writings, as we have just 
seen.  
 
The alternative approach recommended by Finnis and Keown has also more 
recently been advocated by E Garrard and S Wilkinson, who point out, 
disagreeing with Bland, that the “health carer’s intention is not to bring about 
death, but to protect the patient from a burden or a harm”.27 It is noteworthy, 
too, that even critics of the relevance of the distinction believe that it could in 
principle apply to withdrawal and lawful refusal of life-sustaining measures, so 
as to distinguish those who intend their own deaths from those who merely 
foresee them. Thus David Price has pointed out: 
 
[t]he courts do not invoke DDE [the doctrine of double effect and its associated 
intention/foresight distinction] ... although this would be possible, ie withdrawal of 
treatment, but not death, is intended, nor is death the means to any other end. 28 
 
Price draws a different lesson from this than do Finnis, Keown and Garrard 
and Wilkinson. For Price, the fact that the courts do not invoke the 
intention/foresight distinction in the case of withdrawal, even though it is 
available, shows that the distinction cannot support the weight the courts 
make it bear in the case of palliative care, where no alternative other than the 
intention/foresight distinction is available to absolve doctors of criminal 
responsibility. Thus, for Price, because the Law Lords in Bland could rely on 
the alternative distinction between acts and omissions – a distinction that is 
unavailable in the case of palliative pain relief – they could openly admit what 
they would otherwise be forced to deny, namely, that the doctors intended 
Anthony’s death. They are forced to deny this in the case of palliative care, 
because the act/omission distinction is unavailable.29 Of course for Finnis, 
Keown and Garrard and Wilkinson, Price’s worries concerning the 
intention/foresight distinction would be unfounded and the court would, 
indeed, have been better off relying on the intention/foresight distinction in 
Bland than the act/omission distinction, which Keown declares to be “a 
distinction without a difference”. 30 
 
In the following section, I will show that Finnis, Keown and Garrard and 
Wilkinson are wrong to think that the distinction could, in principle, apply to 
                                                 
27 E Garrard and S Wilkinson, ‘Passive Euthanasia” 2005 (31) Journal of Medical Ethics 64, p 
65. 
28 D Price, ‘Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double Effect’ (1997) 17 (2) Legal Studies 323, p 
339. Unfortunately Price conflates the question of whether the conduct is intended 
(withdrawal) with whether the consequence is intended (death). On this point, see McGee, n 1 
p 373. 
29 This, for Price, illustrates what he calls “an absence of transparency pervad[ing] the judicial 
approach” by which he means that the judiciary is covertly sanctioning euthanasia but hiding 
behind the intention/foresight distinction in doing so – unless there is another, more readily 
available justification for the proposed conduct. But their ready concession that it is present in 
omissions shows that it is really present in acts as well, and their attempt to hold otherwise 
cannot be sustained. Ibid p 339f. 
30 J Keown, n 9 pt 67. 
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withdrawal and lawful refusals. Similarly, we will see that the fact that the 
judiciary does not apply the intention/foresight distinction to withdrawals does 
not show, pace Price, that there is a covert acknowledgement that the 
distinction is unsustainable and so cannot likewise be applied to palliative 
care. For contrary to Price’s assertion, it would not be possible to apply this 
distinction to withdrawal at all, and this is why the courts have not done so. My 
intention here is to explain the limited relevance of the intention/foresight 
distinction in end of life decision making, taking up some of the challenges 
Keown poses to me in his reply. I then explain how the act/omission 
distinction remains the better basis for distinguishing between lawful 
withholding and withdrawing of life-sustaining measures and euthanasia, and 
how it is on this basis that the principle of the sanctity of life can continue to 
be defended. It is to these tasks I now turn. 
 
3. Misconceived reliance on the test of failure to 
determine the presence of intention 
 
It is necessary to begin the discussion by recalling precisely how the 
distinction between intention and foresight is to be drawn in this context. 
Traditionally, the intention/foresight distinction has been invoked to explain 
how a doctor who knows that, as a consequence of administering a pain-
relieving drug to a terminally ill patient, the patient’s life will be abbreviated, 
may not actually intend the patient’s death but rather only intend to relieve the 
patient’s pain.31 The abbreviation of the patient’s life in this case is merely a 
foreseen side-effect of action taken to achieve the intended consequence of 
relieving the patient’s pain. The distinction therefore applies even where 
foresight equals knowledge, that is, where the doctor does not merely foresee 
that death might result, but where he knows with certainty that death will 
result. Even in such a case, death need not be intended. The applicability of 
the distinction in pain relief, although it has been subjected to vigorous 
criticism, 32 accords with less controversial examples of the distinction. Thus, a 
police officer knows that, as a consequence of breaking bad news to relatives 
of a loved one, the relatives will become upset, but the officer does not intend 
to upset the relatives. This is because upsetting the relatives is not the 
purpose of breaking the news to them. Likewise, a doctor knows that a 
consequence of chemotherapy is that the patient will suffer from unpleasant 
side-effects, but the doctor does not intend to cause those side-effects 
because making the patient suffer is not the purpose of the treatment, but 
rather making the cancer recede and making the patient better.  
 
These examples show that a result foreseen as certain does not equate to an 
intended result. In addition to being foreseen as certain to occur, the 
consequence must also be the objective or purpose for which the conduct is 
                                                 
31 R v. Adams [1957] Crim LR 365; Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 
789; s 282A Criminal Code (Qld); Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 
(SA).  
32 See, eg, Jonathon Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives, (Penguin, 1977) pp 86-91; 
Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: a Critique (Oxford University Press, 
1987) pp 83-165; Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1993) 
pp 209-10; and D Price “Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double Effect”, n 28.  
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undertaken in order to be intended.33 In the context of palliative care, it is 
conceptually possible that a doctor only intend to relieve a patient’s pain, 
rather than abbreviate the patient’s life, even though the doctor foresees that 
abbreviation of the patient’s life is certain to occur.  
 
John Keown and I are in agreement up to this point.34 However, Keown thinks 
that this distinction can be applied also to cases of withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining measures from terminally ill patients.35  This is the point on 
which we disagree. In essence, Keown believes that my rejection of the 
application of the distinction to cases of withdrawal, and my reasons for 
rejecting Antony Duff’s test of failure as a criterion for the distinction, shows 
that I myself conflate the two concepts: 
 
In short, McGee starts by distinguishing intention from foresight but seems to end by 
conflating them.36 
 
In particular, Keown challenges me to explain the inadequacy of the test of 
failure as a criterion of intention and foresight and to explain what alternative 
test I would propose in its place.37 Antony Duff developed this test because 
there are many cases where it is difficult to tell whether, indeed, a result is 
part of the agent’s plan or purpose or is merely a side-effect of it. Duff’s test 
appears to provide a precise means of determining this question.  
 
The test of failure as a means of distinguishing between intention and 
foresight 
 
On Duff’s test, if a person would not regard their action a failure if the 
consequence is not brought about, then they do not intend that consequence, 
but only foresee it.38  At first glance, this test seems to accord with the normal 
understanding of an intended result as something purposed. And it seems to 
explain the examples we have so far examined: the policeman would not 
regard himself as having failed if the relatives do not become upset, and the 
chemotherapist would not regard himself as having failed if the patient 
suffered no side-effects. Likewise, it seems to apply to palliative care: the 
                                                 
33 It should be noted that the case law in the UK has rejected the broader notion of intention 
as including consequences foreseen as a probable result of one’s acts: R v Maloney [1985] 1 
All ER 1025 and R v Hancock and Shankland [1986] 1 AC 455. The case of R v Woollin 
[1999] 1 AC 82 has been considered by some to reactivate the uncertainties resolved by R v 
Maloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025, to the extent that Lord Steyn states that “a result foreseen as 
virtually certain is an intended result”. However, the context of his comments make it clear 
that he has not overruled R v Maloney in respect of the ratio of that case, namely, that 
foresight of a result as a probable consequence is not an element of murder, but rather plays 
an evidentiary role only: the jury is entitled to find intention where foresight of a result as 
probable or virtually certain is satisfied and there is no other defeating evidence in the 
circumstances that would resist such a finding.  
34 J Keown, n 1 p 393. 
35 J Keown, n 9 p 14. 
36 J Keown, n 1 pp 393 – 394. 
37 J Keown, n 1 p 394: ‘…if McGee rejects the ‘failure test’ what does he propose in its 
place?’. 
38 A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law 
(Blackwell 1990) pp 61-3. 
 9
doctor would not regard himself or herself as having failed if, as a 
consequence of administering the pain-relieving drug, the patient’s life was 
not, contrary to expectation, abbreviated. For Keown, it would also apply to 
withholding and withdrawing medical treatment from a terminally ill patient: the 
doctor would not regard himself as having failed if, contrary to expectation, the 
patient nevertheless did not die even though life sustaining measures were 
withheld or withdrawn from a terminally ill patient. Indeed, the test is expressly 
applied by Garrard and Wilkinson: 
 
...whether the healthcare professional’s intention is to bring about death can be 
established by using the following counterfactual test: if the patient does not die, has 
the health carer succeeded in his or her aim? ... in the case of withdrawing or 
withholding treatment because it would be too burdensome or harmful, then the 
health carer can have succeeded in this  aim – to protect the patient from a particular 
burden or harm – even though the patient pulls through without treatment.39   
 
Difficulty with the test of failure as applied to withdrawal 
 
 
My doubts about the utility of this test as a criterion for distinguishing intention 
and foresight concern some of the cases to which it has been thought that the 
test could usefully be applied.40 One such case concerns the withdrawal of life 
sustaining measures such as food and water. The fundamental difficulty here 
is that it is impossible to imagine the patient surviving the withdrawal 
unexpectedly, as is required by the test of failure. For instance, let us assume 
we want to know whether the doctor’s intention in withdrawing food and water 
is only to relieve the patient from an intolerable loss of dignity, rather than 
bring about the patient’s death. The test requires us to ask: would the doctor 
regard himself as having failed if, even though the food and water is 
withdrawn, the patient did not die? If he would not regard himself as having 
failed, that shows that his end is exclusively that of relieving the patient from 
the intolerable loss of dignity, not the patient’s death.  
 
But unfortunately, it is not possible to envisage such a counterfactual 
scenario: if the doctor withdraws food and water from the patient, the patient 
will die. 41 It is nonsensical to imagine that a patient can go on living without 
                                                 
39 E Garrard and S Wilkinson, n 27, p 65. 
40 J Keown takes me to task for my criticism of the use of fanciful fictional scenarios to shed 
light on our concepts, and argues that fact can be stranger than fiction. He then cites the 
example of the mountaineer who had to cut the rope knowing his mate on the other end 
would die if he did so, in order that he could save himself (John Keown, supra n 1 p 393ff). 
With respect, my argument was not that fictional scenarios should be avoided, but rather that 
fanciful fictional scenarios – of the kind that a bomber could blow up a plane, yet all the 
passengers ‘miraculously’ parachute to safety – should be avoided as such examples do not, 
in my view, shed the kind of light on our concepts that might be thought. The mountaineer 
example used by Keown, however, is not akin to the bomber example and would not 
vulnerable to my criticism.  
41 I leave aside here cases where a patient might suddenly improve to such an extent 
following the withdrawal that a doctor would change his mind and restart the provision of food 
and water. This seems to be the kind of scenario that Garrard and Wilkinson have in mind. 
However, effectively such a scenario just pushes us back to a case where the doctor is not 
yet ready to make the decision to allow the patient to die. What we are concerned with are 
cases where the doctor has decided to allow a patient to die given their current condition, 
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food and water. The requisite counterfactual situation that must be envisaged 
cannot in reality occur, which renders the application of the test in this context 
impossible – it cannot get off the ground.42  This makes withdrawal of food 
and water unlike the other examples discussed above, where the 
counterfactual scenario is possible. In the case of the policeman breaking bad 
news to a loved one, it is possible that the relatives will not become upset – 
for example, if there had been a long-running family dispute or feud. Such 
possibilities are unfortunately an all too real experience for some family 
members. It is therefore genuinely possible to ask whether a policeman would 
regard his action a failure if the relatives do not become upset. Similarly, a 
patient’s hair may not fall out when a dose of chemotherapy is administered – 
the dosage in the course of chemotherapy may not be sufficient to produce 
that effect, or the type of chemotherapy drug administered may not have that 
side-effect, or the patient may simply be more resistant to the hair loss than 
the doctor expected, or a drug may be discovered that counteracts the effect 
of the hair loss and the patient takes the drug without the doctor having been 
informed. For these reasons, the test of failure can be applied to the action of 
administering chemotherapy, and it can legitimately be asked: would the 
doctor regard their action a failure if the patient’s hair did not fall out? This is 
not, however, a possibility in the case of withdrawal of food and water. There 
is no scope for an unexpected result that a human being no longer needs to 
eat and drink at all.43 It follows that the test of failure cannot therefore apply to 
                                                                                                                                            
where that condition will not improve. The question is: in these cases, does the doctor intend 
the patient’s death? 
42 It is here that the temptation to imagine a fanciful fictional scenario that flouts conceptual 
possibilities may raise its ugly head. One might be tempted to say: but just imagine, for the 
sake of argument, that a human being could survive without food and water. I refer the reader 
to my warnings against this temptation in my original paper, pp 367-9. For instance, would we 
still call a ‘human being’ who did not need to eat or drink to stay alive a human being at all? 
Would even the broader concept of ‘animal’ apply? The point of these questions is to highlight 
the conceptual limits that prevent us from applying Duff’s test in these circumstances. It is not 
clear that our concept of ‘human being’ as tailored to this world, would apply in any such 
fanciful counterfactual scenario, and, even if it did, it would be a considerably adjusted 
concept having overlaps with our current one but also extending to cases we have yet to 
conceive, and for this reason I do not think that talk of worlds in which a human being could 
live without needing to consume food and water is coherent. It is also worth noting the 
following: once we allow these fantastical possibilities to be entertained, it is difficult to see 
how withdrawal could be distinguished from the administration of a lethal injection, for we 
could start entertaining a fantastical possibility of the following kind: a doctor administers a 
lethal injection which, by some miracle, cures the patient of their terminal illness and results in 
the patient changing their mind about their decision to die. In such a case, the doctor would 
not go about trying to administer another lethal dose. It would follow that, in such a case, the 
doctor would not regard his action a failure and therefore does not intend death even when 
administering a lethal dose. It is clear that if we indulge in entertaining these fanciful 
counterfactual scenarios, the distinction between intention and foresight begins to lose its 
footing. 
43 It is central to what we understand as an organism of any kind – central to the biological 
notion of organic life – that the entity engage in nutritional intake. A being whose source of 
energy is a battery or some other non organic entity would not qualify as what we understand 
as human. The conceivability of science fictional scenarios of androids or machines with self-
awareness does not affect this point, but reinforces it, because, whether we would regard 
such beings as persons or not, we certainly would not regard them as human but, even if we 
did, our concept of what is human would have shifted – it would be a different concept to what 
it is now. Imagining a world in which humans didn’t need to eat or drink is therefore not 
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withdrawal of food and water, because the counterfactual scenario that we 
must entertain (the patient surviving and living on, in spite of the withdrawal of 
food and water) is not genuinely possible. This may seem to represent a 
serious limitation on the test itself in so far as, to the extent I am participating 
in a debate with Keown over whether death can be regarded as intended in 
the withdrawal of food and water, a criterion for intention is surely required, 
yet the test of failure, requiring as it does the entertainment of a counterfactual 
scenario that in reality cannot occur here, can provide no assistance in this 
case.  However, the test remains useful where the counterfactual scenarios 
that it requires us to consider are genuine possibilities.  
 
4. If not the test of failure, what else? 
 
Keown asks: if the test of failure is inadequate here, what alternative do I 
propose?44 How do I distinguish between a case where a result is intended 
and one where it is merely foreseen – for instance, where a doctor in 
providing chemotherapy merely foresees but does not intend that the patient’s 
hair will fall out? If it is absurd to deny, as I do, that the 9/11 suicide bombers 
intended their own deaths, is it therefore also absurd to deny that a doctor 
who foresees the certainty that palliative drugs will incidentally hasten death 
intends to kill the patient? 45  The answer to these questions has already 
emerged above: a foreseen, as distinguished from an intended, consequence, 
is a consequence which the agent does not aim to bring about, and is a 
consequence which is not the objective with which the conduct is undertaken. 
For example, in the case of palliative pain relief, if a reason the relief is given 
is that it will abbreviate the patient’s life, then the abbreviation of the patient’s 
life would be a purpose of providing the relief, and so would be intended. If, on 
the other hand, the sole reason for giving the relief is to ensure the patient is 
as free from pain and as comfortable as possible, then hastening death is not 
intended, for it is not the purpose for which the relief is given.46  
 
The purpose of the conduct can often be identified by reference to the 
function of the treatment. For example, the function of chemotherapy is not to 
allow the patient’s hair to fall out, but the cancer to recede. Similarly, the 
function of pain relieving drugs is to relieve pain. In the case of R v Cox 
(1992) 12 BMLR 38, potassium chloride was administered by the doctor, and 
the jury found against the doctor because potassium chloride could not be 
used to relieve pain. Potassium chloride had no palliative function, and so it 
                                                                                                                                            
coherent, because it assumes that ‘human’ means exactly the same as it does now in our 
world, without such beings. And that’s the very assumption that cannot be granted.  
44 J Keown n 1 p 394. 
45 J Keown n 1 p 394. 
46 It should be conceded of course that the line is not always easy to draw. What if a specific 
dose known to hasten death is required to relieve pain, yet the fact that death will be 
hastened is welcomed by the doctor? Is death intended in such a case? Welcoming death is 
not sufficient. For there to be a dual intention – an intention to relieve pain and an intention to 
hasten death – the fact that death will be hastened must also be a reason that the dose is 
given; it must be a factor that makes a difference to what the doctor decides to do. If he is 
going to administer the dose anyway to relieve the pain, then the fact that an earlier death will 
be welcomed is not on its own sufficient to transform the consequence into an intended 
consequence.  
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was not possible for the doctor in that case to contend that his purpose, and 
intent, was therefore merely to relieve pain. For the function of that drug, as 
used by the doctor in that case, was to bring about the patient’s death: that is 
what it was used to do. 
 
Why can’t we say that the purpose of a lethal injection, as proposed by 
euthanasia advocates, is to relieve pain and suffering? The reason is that the 
function of the drugs given in the proposed cases is to end the patient’s life. It 
cannot be said that their function is to relieve pain and suffering, for the 
patient dies, and does not experience any such relief. It is misleading to say 
that, by ending his or her life, we are relieving pain and suffering. To call 
death a relief here is to speak figuratively. By contrast, in palliative relief, the 
relief aimed for is literal, not figurative. The aim is to relieve the symptoms of 
excessive pain. It is by confusing the literal with the figurative way of speaking 
that palliative care comes to be confused with euthanasia.  
 
Are things different, however, in the case of withholding and withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures? It is necessary here to distinguish different cases, the 
case of sensate and the case of insensate patients. But in the final analysis, 
the result is the same: the purpose of withholding or withdrawal is to allow the 
patient to die. It might be argued that the objective of withholding or 
withdrawing from a sensate patient is to prevent or relieve the patient from 
suffering burdensome treatment. Finnis, for example, has made this 
suggestion: 
 
...if one withdraws life-sustaining measures precisely because that has been 
requested by a competent patient on grounds of their burdensomeness, one need not 
be purposing, aiming at, or intending the patient’s foreseeably certain death.47  
 
Finnis’ contention is supported by Garrard and Wilkinson: 
 
The health carer’s intention is not to bring about death, but to protect the patient from 
a burden or harm. 48 
 
Similarly, Keown states: 
 
.... ...a doctor may properly withhold or withdraw a life-prolonging treatment which is 
futile (that is, cannot secure a significant therapeutic benefit) or which the patient 
would find too burdensome, even though the doctor foresees that non-treatment may 
or will result in the patient’s life ending sooner than would otherwise be the case.49 
 
However, these contentions are untenable. If the purpose of relieving the 
patient from the burdensome nature of the treatment was to be achieved by 
the removal of the life-sustaining measures, naturally one would expect that 
the patient would experience relief after its removal. In this sense, one would 
expect some improvement in the patient’s condition (in the form of relief from 
the burden), just as, with palliative care, the pain relief constitutes an 
improvement in the patient’s condition to the extent that they have been 
                                                 
47 J M Finnis n 7 p 332. 
48 Garrard and Wilkinson, n 9 p 65. 
49 Italics added. J Keown, n 15 p 42. 
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relieved from their pain. In palliative care, the patient is made to feel better – 
their pain is relieved, and this relief can be achieved independently of the 
patient’s death (that is, the pain relieving properties of the drug, not the 
patient’s death, bring the pain relief in palliative care).50 For this reason, “pain 
relief” counts as a genuinely independent purpose that can be aimed at. But 
as a consequence of the removal of food and water and artificial ventilation, 
the patient is going to starve and suffocate to death. It would therefore be 
inappropriate to describe the period of time between withdrawal and death as 
a period of relief for the patient, and therefore as any kind of improvement in 
their condition over the condition they are in before the treatment is removed. 
In short, it is difficult to see how the condition the patient will be in during the 
period of time between withdrawal and death can be a condition the doctor 
could meaningfully aim for when that condition will be one in which the patient 
starves and/or suffocates to death. To talk about such a condition as “relief” 
from the burden of treatment would therefore be nonsense. Consequently, the 
patient is only relieved, in the figurative sense, from the burden when the 
patient has died. 
 
It is also worth noting that if it is the life-sustaining measures, the very act of 
sustaining the patient’s life, that is causing the burden, then removing those 
measures is to stop sustaining the patient’s life – there is a conceptual link 
between what is being done (withdrawing the life-sustaining measures) and 
what is brought about as a consequence of what is being done (no longer 
sustaining the patient’s life). There is, by contrast, no such conceptual link 
between pain relief and a hastened death because the relief does not stem 
from the fact that the patient’s life is being abbreviated.  
 
Finnis, Keown and Garrard and Wilkinson face further difficulties when we 
turn from sensate competent patients to insensate incompetent patients. For 
here, it is not meaningful, of course, to speak of a burden at all. Anthony 
Bland was permanently unconscious, and the treatment was not a burden to 
him. Finnis’ and Keown’s analysis therefore cannot apply to the very case 
they argued that it could apply to. At most, one could say that treatment was 
withdrawn to end an intolerable loss of dignity,51 but clearly such an objective 
could only be achieved by allowing the patient to die; the withdrawal of life-
prolonging measures alone could hardly be said to restore to the patient in 
this state his or her dignity.  
 
The purpose of withdrawing the life-sustaining measures, then, is indeed to 
allow the patient to die. The patient’s death is the aim or objective of 
withdrawing the life-sustaining measures. It cannot therefore be regarded as 
                                                 
50 It is for this reason that  Huxtable is mistaken, in his critique of double effect, to claim that 
“the real issue is not what the doctor is administering, but what his intention is in doing so” 
(Richard Huxtable Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: from Conflict to Compromise (Routledge, 
2007) pp 96-97). For what is being administered has a direct bearing on the question of what 
the doctor’s intentions are in administering the drug. If, for example, the drug has no pain 
relieving properties, then the doctor cannot claim that his intention is merely to relieve the 
patient’s pain.  
51 Finnis expressly distances himself from such a contention. See Finnis, n 7 p 336. This 
leaves him unable to identify a purpose other than allowing the patient to die, as I have 
attempted to show here.  
 14
the mere side-effect of the pursuit of some other aim or objective. The Law 
Lords were therefore right, pace Finnis, Keown, Price, Garrard and Wilkinson, 
to hold that death is intended in such a case. This difference between 
withdrawal and palliative care is reflected in the fact that, where pain relief is 
being given, we do not characterise that decision as ‘allowing the patient to 
die sooner than he or she otherwise would’. We call it a decision to alleviate 
the patient’s pain.52 By contrast, where a decision is taken to withdraw life-
sustaining measures, we call that a decision to allow the patient to die. For 
instance, burdensome treatment might be removed in order to allow a patient 
to die peacefully. Consider, for instance, the following remark in K (a minor), 
Re [2006] EWHC 1007 (Fam): 
 
On 6 April 2006, on the application of a Teaching Hospital NHS Trust (The Trust), I 
made a declaration to enable the medical staff of the Trust to remove from the 
abdomen of a baby in their care a tube necessary to maintain her nutrition, and to 
move to a regime of palliative care in order to allow her to die peacefully over a short 
period of time (italics added).53 
 
Here the objective of removal of the tube is unquestionably described as 
allowing the patient to die peacefully. It is therefore simply not plausible to try 
to redescribe this in terms that remove the obvious intention or objective of 
removing the tube.  
 
It follows, therefore, that if there is to be a meaningful distinction between 
withholding and withdrawing on the one hand and euthanasia on the other, 
that distinction cannot reside with the respective intentions of the doctors in 
each case. Rather the distinction remains dependent on the act/omission 
distinction.  Before turning to discuss this distinction, however, it is necessary 
to turn to deal with some other contentions raised by Keown which, in my 
view, expose some genuine difficulties in his account. 
 
5. Quality of Patient’s Condition versus Quality of Patient’s 
Life and the Concept of Medical Futility 
 
It is necessary at this point to deal with a connected issue I have discussed 
elsewhere to which Keown has responded. My contention is that, in the end of 
life context, when a decision is made to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
measures and thereby allow a patient to die, quality of life considerations 
enter into the process of reaching the decision that this course of action is in 
                                                 
52 I leave aside here those cases – widely reported in the press – where palliation of a 
person’s pain has been undertaken with the deliberate intention of abbreviating the patient’s 
life. It is no part of my argument that a doctor cannot intend to kill the patient when 
administering palliative care. Rather, my argument is simply that a doctor does not of 
necessity intend to kill the patient when administering palliative care, ie, it is meaningful to 
distinguish cases where the doctor does intend to abbreviate the patient’s life, from cases 
where he or she does not (and for me only the latter are genuine instances of ‘palliative care’ 
– I would question, of course, whether what the doctor is doing could still be called “palliative 
care” at all if he intends to abbreviate the patient’s life). It is possible merely to foresee the 
abbreviation of a patient’s life in palliative care, but it is not possible merely to foresee the 
abbreviation of a patient’s life in withdrawal and euthanasia. The points I am making are 
conceptual not empirical.  
53 K (a minor), Re [2006] EWHC 1007 (Fam) at 1007. 
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the best interests of the patient. For example, in the end of life context, one of 
the things that the doctors and the courts will consider is whether or not there 
are prospects of any improvement in the patient’s condition. If there is no 
prospect of any improvement in the patient’s condition, the treatment can be 
withdrawn. One way of expressing this requirement is to say that the 
treatment can be withdrawn if it is futile. Keown himself advocates this test54, 
endorsing the opinion of Lord Goff, who stated:  
 
But for my part I cannot see that medical treatment is appropriate 
or requisite simply to prolong a patient's life, when such treatment has no therapeutic 
purpose of any kind, as where it is futile because the patient is unconscious and there 
is no prospect of any improvement in his condition.55 
 
Thus, for Lord Goff, it was appropriate to withdraw tube-feeding from Anthony 
Bland because Anthony was permanently unconscious – that is, there was no 
prospect of improving Anthony’s condition. The requirement of futility was 
therefore satisfied.  
 
Now, the claim that the treatment can be withdrawn on the ground that 
Anthony was permanently unconscious presupposes as its foundation the 
judgement that it is not worthwhile preserving the life of a permanently 
unconscious person – that it would only be worthwhile preserving their life if 
their condition improved so that they were no longer permanently 
unconscious. Normally, the fact that a patient will die if a treatment is 
withdrawn is an overwhelming reason for continuing the treatment, but that 
was not the case here. The reason is that the life of a patient in a permanent 
vegetative state is not considered to be worth preserving.  
 
To illustrate this point, I introduced my kidney dialysis example by way of 
contrast. Consider, I wrote, the case of competent patients requiring kidney 
dialysis machines to continue living, and assume a kidney transplant is 
unavailable to them during their lifetime, and no cure will be discovered to 
improve their condition.56 Although nothing further can be done to improve 
their condition, we would surely baulk at any suggestion that the treatment 
should be withdrawn.57The reason for this is that the patient is not only still 
alive but also capable of leading a life, whereas in the case of the PVS patient 
like Anthony Bland, the patient is permanently unconscious and so incapable 
of leading a life at all. 58  This difference is inevitably what we rely on in 
accepting that it is morally permissible (and now lawful) to withdraw treatment 
– hence the requirement that the vegetative state be permanent. It was only 
because Anthony Bland was permanently unconscious that doctors began to 
entertain withdrawing treatment as a serious possibility and that leave of the 
court to do so was sought.  
                                                 
54 J Keown, n 1 p 396. 
55 [1993] AC 789 at 869. 
56 A McGee, n 1, p 379. 
57 A McGee, n 1, p 379. 
58 There will, of course, be a whole host of intermediate cases between the extreme of a 
perfectly conscious being having capacity and the extreme of a permanently unconscious 




Some of Keown’s remarks in reply to this point reveal an inability, on his part, 
to arrive at a sound criterion of medical futility in this context. Quoting my use 
of the kidney dialysis example, Keown claims:  
 
McGee clearly misunderstands the concept of futility as understood by sanctify of life 
proponents. Treatments do not need to be curative to be beneficial. Some treatments 
cure; others prevent deterioration; still others palliate symptoms. Dialysis clearly 
benefits kidney patients by maintaining their health and functioning even though it 
cannot cure their underlying condition.59 
 
Keown’s point here is that when, in my hypothetical dialysis example, I ask 
the reader to assume that no cure can be discovered, I have assumed that 
curing the patient is the sole function of medical treatment, whereas it is also 
used to prevent deterioration and palliate symptoms. With respect, however, 
this criticism is wide of the mark.  
 
First, I only said that the treatment must be capable of improving, rather than 
curing, the patient’s condition,60 but for the sake of argument I will assume in 
what follows that Keown is using ‘curative’ in a wide enough sense to include 
‘improving’ the patient’s condition, and that his objection is that not all 
treatments are aimed merely at curing or improving the patient’s condition – 
some being aimed at preventing deterioration or maintaining the patient’s 
health and functioning, or palliating symptoms.61  
 
Second, my point is precisely that a life-sustaining measure, which is neither 
capable of curing nor improving the patient’s condition, nevertheless sustains 
life and therefore, if the requirement of futility is to be fulfilled (it has to be futile 
in order to be withdrawn), the objective of the treatment has to be more than 
simply maintaining the patient’s health and functioning, preventing 
deterioration or palliating symptoms. In many cases – and in the case of 
Anthony Bland – a life-sustaining measure is doing its job of precisely 
sustaining the patient’s life. It cannot, therefore, be withdrawn on the basis of 
the criterion of futility, unless that objective is more than simply sustaining the 
patient’s life. It follows that if the criterion of futility is to be used, the objective 
of the treatment must be some improvement to the patient’s condition, rather 
than the objective of merely sustaining it. 62 
 
                                                 
59 J Keown, n 1 p 399. 
60 “In such a case, medical treatment as Keown understands it is certainly futile – nothing 
further can be done for them to improve their condition. But we would surely baulk at the 
suggestion that it should be withdrawn”, A McGee, n 1 p 379. 
61 For this reason, in what follows, the reader should understand the term ‘curative’ to mean 
‘capable of improving the patient’s condition’ rather than completely curing them of their 
illness. 
62 Similar criticisms have been raised of Keown’s position since my paper was published. 
See, in particular, David Price, ‘My view of the sanctity of life: a rebuttal of John Keown’s 
critique’ (2007) (27) 4 Legal Studies 549 p 555ff.  Price considers his own views to establish 
that the sanctity of life principle cannot be defended principally because, like Keown and 
Finnis, he rejects the significance of the act/omission distinction, and questions the relevance 
of the mental element of intention. I take the contrary view on the act/omission distinction in 
section 5, below.  
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Given that Keown himself states that had the House of Lords in Bland 
adopted the criterion of futility proposed by Lord Goff, “the law would arguably 
have remained consistent with the principle of the sanctity of life”,63 he clearly 
endorses the requirement that the treatment be futile before it is withdrawn. 
But what is the criterion of futility at this point for Keown? He now insists in his 
reply that the criterion need not be that the treatment fails to cure the patient, 
pointing out that the “treatment” is not futile if it sustains the patient’s life or 
“prevents deterioration”. And in the case of tube-feeding and ventilation, it 
would seem that he would be right to do so, because such ‘treatment’ is not 
normally carried out for the purpose of improving  the patient’s condition, but 
merely for the purpose of sustaining the patient, that is, keeping them alive. 
So what is the criterion of futility, which, as Keown insists, is the threshold for 
permissibly withdrawing the treatment?  
 
Let us recall here the exact words of Lord Goff, which Keown himself quotes 
with approval as formulating he criterion of futility to be adopted64: 
 
But for my part I cannot see that medical treatment is appropriate 
or requisite simply to prolong a patient's life, when such treatment has no therapeutic 
purpose of any kind, as where it is futile because the patient is unconscious and there 
is no prospect of any improvement in his condition.65 
 
I have emphasised the final words in this passage because, clearly, they 
show that the criterion of futility which Goff endorsed is the criterion of 
curability (in the wide sense Keown gives this term): Anthony was 
unconscious and his condition could not be improved. A critical factor in the 
decision was therefore the fact that the vegetative state was permanent. It 
was therefore irrelevant that the treatment was merely sustaining his life.  
 
The focus of Lord Goff was therefore not restricted to the current treatment, 
but extended to whether any possible treatment either at that time or at some 
future time, could be given that might improve his condition. If, by contrast, the 
focus had been simply on the objective of the actual treatment currently being 
given, here, the tube-feeding, then a different result would have been 
reached, because it is not possible to describe the objective of giving the 
patient food and water as that of curing the patient or improving their 
condition. Clearly, the objective of tube-feeding is to sustain the patient and it 
could not be said that it was failing to achieve that objective. His Lordship 
therefore took a broader view, asking not whether the tube-feeding was 
sustaining the patient or maintaining his health, but whether there were really 
any prospects of the patient regaining any kind of consciousness or improving 
in any way. In short, Lord Goff decided that even though tube-feeding was 
                                                 
63 J Keown, n 1 p 396. 
64 J Keown, n 1 p 396. Note however a curious inconsistency in Keown’s position. For 
although he endorses Lord Goff’s test of futility here, which Lord Goff explains as meaning 
that the treatment is serving “no worthwhile therapeutic purpose of any kind”, Keown also 
states in his reply: “nowhere do I state…that it is permissible to withdraw burdensome 
treatment only if it is not serving any useful therapeutic purpose” (J Keown n 1 p 395). I 
cannot see how these statements are reconcilable, and this denial no doubt betrays the 
difficulties Keown experiences in proposing a sound criterion of futility.  
65 [1993] AC 789 at 869. 
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sustaining the patient’s health, merely sustaining the patient’s life was itself a 
futile endeavour in the circumstances. Such a conclusion necessarily 
presupposes an assumption about the quality of such an existence, namely, 
that it is not worth preserving. It follows that, as I insisted in the paper, the 
distinction between the quality of the patient's condition and the quality of the 
patient's life cannot be separated in this context, contrary to Keown's claim.   
 
Keown’s anxieties about conceding that quality of life considerations do form 
part of a decision to withdraw treatment arise mainly from his concern that 
such a concession would make inroads into the sanctity of life principle. 
However, as we shall see the next section, these anxieties are unfounded. 
 
6. Intending death 
 
Does my insistence that death is intended in withdrawal mean that doctors are 
killing these patients? No. “Intending death” is actually ambiguous between: 
1. Intending to kill someone; or  
2. Intending to allow someone to die 
This distinction between killing someone and allowing them to die has been 
misunderstood. The reason the Law Lords in Bland conceded that intention 
was present, but nonetheless thought that the conduct was distinct from 
euthanasia, is that Anthony’s life was being artificially prolonged. It is against 
the background of the prolongation of a person’s life that the distinction 
between lawful withdrawal and unlawful euthanasia must be understood. 
Where a patient is terminally ill, and their life is already being prolonged by 
artificial measures such as artificial nutrition and hydration, their death is 
being deferred by those life-sustaining measures. To withdraw those 
measures is therefore to stop prolonging their life, to stop deferring their 
death. In euthanasia, by contrast, the very difficulty faced by a doctor is that 
the patient’s life is not being prolonged at all and, as a result, may suffer 
intolerably. In such a case, the dilemma is not whether to continue deferring 
death, but rather whether to cut short the patient’s life that, without 
intervention, would continue, with potentially intolerable suffering. In 
withdrawal – as Keown himself concedes – “we are bowing to the inevitable” 
but there is no bowing to the inevitable where euthanasia is concerned – it is 
precisely because death is not inevitable at the required time that euthanasia 
is being seriously considered as an option. It is for this reason, then, that the 
doctor’s conduct in withdrawal is to be understood as allowing the patient to 
die, and the intention in that case is therefore to allow the patient to die. That 
is, for the reasons given, different from an intention to kill. 
 
Elsewhere I have referred to the distinction between withdrawal and 
euthanasia as a distinction between actively intervening in the natural 
sequence of events and overriding nature to wrest control from it of our 
ultimate fate.66 Both Keown and Price have taken issue with my language as 
a way of distinguishing them. Keown points out that ‘“Nature” will allow 
patients in PVS to live for years if we provide them with food and fluids and to 
                                                 
66 See McGee, n 1 pp 382-384.  
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die of dehydration if we do not’67 and so my point that allowing Anthony to die 
means allowing nature to take its course must be wrong. However, Keown’s 
claim here overlooks the fact that allowing PVS patients such as Anthony to 
live for many years is only made possible by the provision of artificial nutrition 
and hydration, which is precisely not allowing nature to take its course.68 
Contrary to Keown’s claim, Anthony could not survive at all if nature were 
allowed to take its course. Rather, he could only survive by being artificially 
fed and hydrated, and therefore by human intervention into the natural course 
of events. In such a case, we are artificially prolonging the patient’s life, and it 
is only when we stop artificially prolonging the patient’s life that we can be 
said to be allowing nature to take its course. In euthanasia, by contrast, we 
are seeking to bring a patient’s life to a premature end. Without a lethal 
injection, they would live on, unsupported by any life-sustaining measure. 
 
Price, on the other hand, has pointed out that my reference to ‘nature’ and my 
talk of allowing someone to die “when nature chooses” makes of nature some 
kind of agent having a kind of religious overtone, where “Nature” replaces 
‘God”.69 But in an increasingly secular age, such talk is out of place. However, 
my reference to nature taking its course and to restoring to nature her 
dominion need not be taken in this way at all, but are merely façons de parler, 
ways of distinguishing between making things happen and allowing things to 
happen. I am no more committed to a religious world view with nature as an 
agent when I refer to nature taking its course than I am committed to a divine 
Giver if I refer to someone as ‘gifted’. Similarly, our continued use of the word 
‘sunrise’ does not commit us to the view that the sun actually rises above the 
earth’s horizon. The use of words and phrases are not tethered to any 
particular discourse, even if, etymologically, they could be shown to have 
originated in such a discourse. It is for precisely this reason that it is 
misconceived to chastise a secular moralist for calling life ‘sacred’ on the 





Keown’s reply has facilitated the mapping of some of the most complex 
conceptual terrain in this area of medical law. In relation to his discussion of 
the intention/foresight distinction, he requested some clarification of how my 
account can succeed in distinguishing intention from foresight in the contexts 
in which this distinction might be held to apply. I have attempted to provide 
that clarification here, offering a more detailed account of the relationship 
                                                 
67 J Keown, n 1 p 401. 
68 Suppose we avoid any talk of ‘nature’ here. We still must distinguish cases where the issue 
is whether we should defer death (where, without any action, death would occur) from cases 
where the issue is whether death might be accelerated (where, without any action, death 
would not occur). The withdrawal/euthanasia distinction is based on the distinction between 
prolonging life and shortening life, and any denial of this distinction is liable only to cause 
unnecessary confusion, bringing us perilously close to the murky waters of ethics by 
categorisation.  
69 See David Price, ‘What Shape to Euthanasia after Bland? Historical, Contemporary and 
Futuristic Paradigms’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 142, p 158. 
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between intention and foresight as applied in the medical context, and at the 
same time clarifying my defence of Bland and, in particular, how I can square 
that defence with my account of the palliation of pain in a terminally-ill patient. 
This also provided me with the opportunity to offer a more fulsome discussion 
of Duff’s criterion of failure for distinguishing intention and foresight. 
Nevertheless, I believe Keown’s central contentions against my paper fail 
because they are based, as we have seen, on several confusions and 
misconceptions that were diagnosed in my original paper. Furthermore, the 
inapplicability of the intention/foresight distinction to withdrawal has serious 
repercussions for Keown’s defence of the sanctity of life principle: since death 
is indeed intended in withdrawal, for the reasons given, Keown’s own defence 
of the principle fails. My arguments in that paper therefore stand intact. The 
sanctity of life principle can only be defended on the basis of the act/omission 
distinction, and that defence must take the form I have presented here. In this 
respect, the only difficulty with the Bland decision is with those portions of the 
judgement where some of the law Lords considered that their decision makes 
inroads into the sanctity of life principle. No doubt their conclusion in this 
regard was influenced by their misplaced anxieties about the moral cogency 
of the act/omission distinction.  
 
In the context of the current debate concerning the possible legalisation of 
assisted dying and euthanasia, two important consequences follow from this 
analysis. First, the argument that it is inconsistent to continue to rule out 
assisted dying and euthanasia while allowing competent refusal and 
withdrawal cannot be sustained. This argument can therefore no more be 
used by those who are sympathetic to the legalisation of assisted dying or 
euthanasia than it can be used, as we have seen, by Keown who is against 
both.  Second, one cannot appeal to Bland in support of the claim that the 
principle of the sanctity of life is not absolute, and argue that appeals to the 
principle are therefore no longer so relevant to the question of whether 
assisted dying or euthanasia should be legalised. The principle remains intact 
and has not been undermined in any way by the Bland decision, even though 
some of their Lordships mistakenly thought otherwise. To that extent, it 
remains relevant to point out that the legalisation of assisted suicide and 
euthanasia would constitute a significant change to the law in that it would 
result in the principle being displaced. Whether or not this indeed should be 
done is not a question I have attempted to address here – I have only wished 
to situate the debate in the correct conceptual terrain. 
 
 
 
